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Abstract 
We present a new scheme for active, or pro- 
grammable, packets based upon a new packet lan- 
guage, SNAP (Safe Networking with Active Pack- 
ets). SNAP'S semantics permit us to prove that all 
SNAP programs are safe with respect to network re- 
source usage and evaluation isolation. Furthermore, 
we describe an implementation of a SNAP inter- 
preter, snapd, which achieves high performance for 
standard networking tasks. This work represents the 
first active packet system that is demonstrated to be 
both safe and efficient. 
1 Introduction 
Increasingly widespread use of the Internet has placed 
new demands on the networking infrastructure. In 
particular, applications now have varied service re- 
quirements such as high bandwidth, low delay, low 
jitter, etc. The one-size-fits-all, single-service model 
of IP  [13], although certainly a key to its success as an 
internetworking protocol, often no longer fits users' 
needs. 
These new demands imply the need for the evo- 
lution of the networking infrastructure. However, 
IP  is notoriously difficult to change (consider that 
IPv6 still has not been adopted), due to its central- 
ized, committee-controlled nature. Active, or pro- 
grammable, networks seek to address this problem by 
making the network extensible and thus more flex- 
'This work was supported by DARPA under Contract 
#N66001-96-C-852. 
ible. Active packets are one method of providing 
a programmable network interface; here, the tradi- 
tional packet header is replaced with a program that 
is executed to determine its handling. Previous re- 
search [4, 171 has demonstrated the utility of active 
packets for new protocols or network configuration to  
irnprove application performance. 
In order to be a usable shared resource, an ac- 
tive packet-based network must balance the oppos- 
ing notions of safety and efficiency. It should not 
be possible for malicious or buggy active packets to  
crash network nodes or carry out denial-of-service 
atjtacks (safety), yet the overhead of executing per- 
packet programs must not be so great that the net- 
work becomes unusable due to its poor performance 
(efficiency). 
We present an active packet scheme that addresses 
both safety and efficiency with the design of a net- 
work bytecode language, SNAP (Safe Networking 
with Active Packets). The SNAP language is de- 
signed with limited expressibility, thus making it pos- 
sible to assert safety theorems about all SNAP pro- 
grams. Furthermore, SNAP has been designed for 
efficient execution. This paper presents the relevant 
safety proofs as well as an experimental demonstra- 
tion of the efficiency of a SNAP implementation. 
In the next section, we provide an overview of pre- 
vious related research, motivating the need for a new 
active packet scheme. In Section 3, we present a de- 
scription of the SNAP bytecode language and outline 
the safety theorems for the language in Section 4. We 
then proceed in Section 5 to describe a SNAP im- 
plementation, with experimental results presented in 
Section 6. We give our concluding remarks in Sec- 
tion 7. 
2 Related Work 
In this section, we discuss previous research on ac- 
tive packets. In particular, we will focus upon the 
different tradeoffs that the designers have made in 
balancing safety versus efficiency. While all of the 
projects we will touch upon have demonstrated util- 
ity derived from the flexibility of active packets, none 
of them has achieved a completely satisfying degree 
of both safety and efficiency. Nonetheless, we draw 
from their experience in the design of our new active 
packet scheme. 
First, we consider the SmartPackets project [14] 
from BBN. Here, network packets contain code in a 
language called Spanner, which is a CISC-style as- 
sembly language. These packets are used for network 
management and diagnostics via an SNMP-like [2] in- 
terface to the nodes. The SmartPackets, when used 
as mobile agents to  move about and configure the net- 
work, reduce network management-related traffic by 
reacting to  local conditions without having the coni- 
munication overhead of a centralized remote man- 
agement center. Schwartz et al. stress the need for a 
compact Spanner representation so that a meaningful 
program can fit within a single link-layer frame and 
be more robust in the face of an overloaded or failing 
network. Unfortunately, the design relies upon the 
use of heavyweight cryptography for authentication 
and access control, thus making them unsuitable for 
general payload transport. 
The ANTS [17] system from MIT uses active pacli- 
ets called capsules, which conceptually contain both a 
data payload and the code for handling that payload. 
In practice, the packets merely contain a pointer to 
the code, which itself is dynamically loaded on de- 
mand from predecessor nodes. There have been nu- 
merous simulation-based demonstrations [7, 61 show- 
ing that ANTS active protocols can enhance applica- 
tion performance. However, the ANTS implementa- 
tion was done in Java, relying heavily upon the safety 
properties of the language and requiring heavyweight 
verification a t  each hop. Indeed, this user-space in- 
terpretation allowed under 20 Mb/s throughput in 
practice 1161. 
A follow-on project to  ANTS was the PAN mobile- 
code platform [9], which provides in-kernel support 
for mobile code. Nygren e t  al. demonstrate line rates 
(over 90 Mb/s) when dynamically loading x86 object 
code. However, this loading is done in an unsafe man- 
ner, thus making it possible for an active packet to 
crash the node. While achieving high enough perfor- 
mance to test active applications, this lack of safety 
makes PAN unsuitable for a shared network infras- 
tructure. 
Finally, the PLAN project [3] from the University 
of Pennsylvania attempts to address safety concerns 
via language design. The PLAN packet language has 
limited expressibility, so that authentication (e.g., by 
cryptography) is not required to execute packet pro- 
grams. Notably, all PLAN programs are guaranteed 
to terminate, although it is still possible to  write ex- 
ponentially long-running programs. To balance the 
lack of expressiveness, PLAN programs may access 
node-resident services that provide more heavyweight 
functionality; since these services are more long-lived 
than ephemeral packets, the costs of safety verifica- 
tion may be amortized across many packets. Hicks 
et  al. have built an active internetwork based on this 
two-level scheme called PLANet [4]. Experimental 
results show application benefits from using active 
packets in the control plane, yet slow PLAN evalua- 
tion leads to the conclusion that active processing 
cannot be done at every hop if reasonable perfor- 
mance is to be attained. 
In summary, prior active packet implementations 
have either been too inefficient for general use as a 
replacement for an I P  header, or they have achieved 
performance at the cost of node or network safety. In 
the next section, we describe our new active packet 
scheme, SNAP, which achieves safety via language de- 
sign (like PLAN or ANTS), is suitably compact for 
use in packets (like SmartPackets), yet is amenable 
to high-speed interpretation (like PAN). SNAP is 
in many ways a descendent of PLAN, especially in 
terms of programming expressibility, yet SNAP of- 
fers stronger safety claims and addresses some of the 
performance concerns experienced in PLANet. In- 
packet P ::= (r, Go, C, S)  where: r = resource bound 
Co = full program 
C = sequence of commands 
S = stack of values 
network N ::= {PI , .  . . , P,} 
(r ,CO, (pul l  n )  :: C,vl  :: . . . :: v, :: S) , -  (r, CO, C,v, :: vl :: . . . :: u, :: S )  (3) 
(r,CO, (bez  n)  :: cl :: . . . :: c, :: C,O :: S )  , ,  (r, CO, C I S )  (4) 
(r,Co,(bez n)  :: C,v  :: S )  + ( r ,Co,C,S)  if v # 0 ( 5 )  
( ~ , C ~ , o p ~ . ~ [ k ]  : :C,vl  :: . . .  : : v i : : S )  +1,,,, 1 ( r , C ~ , C , v i  :: . . .  : :vi : : S )  (6)  
(r - r f , c l  :: c, :: C,,C,vl :: us :: S), N U  {(r,cl :: cn :: C, ,send: :  C, 
:: ..  .. d :: vl :: us :: S)} (r l ,c l  : : c n : : C , , C , , ~ 1  ::us) 
} (9) 
Figure 1: SNAP abstract machine. 
deed, the performance results we present in Section 6 
dispute the commonly-held belief that active packets 
are too slow to be evaluated a t  every node. 
3 SNAP 
In this section we describe our new active packet lan- 
guage, SNAP (Safe Networking with Active Packets). 
SNAP has been designed with limited expressibil- 
ity, to promote the safety properties we will discuss 
in Section 4. In particular, all SNAP programs are 
guaranteed to  terminate, and, more specifically, will 
run in time linear in their length. We have chosen a 
bytecode-style language to permit the application of 
current techniques in fast interpretation and compact 
representation (e.g., for Ocaml [I, 101). 
For purposes of space and simplicity, we present six 
main classes of SNAP bytecodes. Although there are 
actually far more bytecodes, many of them are sim- 
ple primitive operations (e.g., arithmetic) and can be 
grouped together to  specify the semantics. There are 
also some bytecodes that can be viewed simply as 
abbreviations for some sequence of these basic byte- 
codes, these sequences occurring frequently enough to  
justify the additional bytecode for the code space sav- 
ings. Figure 1 describes the basic SNAP operations 
as reductions in a stack-based abstract machine. 
In the SNAP abstract machine, we model the net- 
work as a multisetl of packets, where each packet con- 
tains four fields: a resource bound counter (which will 
behave similarly to IPv4's time-to-live (TTL) field), 
a full program, a sequence of bytecodes left to  exe- 
cute, and a stack of values. Figure 1 describes two 
reduction relations: -+1,1, which describes the ex- 
'A  semantics that distinguished nodes from one another 
might be more descriptive, but is not necessary for the safety 
proofs in the next section. 
ecution of one packet on a given node, and 
which describes the behavior of packets in a network. 
As a matter of notation, --+ is a single-step reduc- 
tion, +" is a sequence of n reductions, and +* 
represents an arbitrary number of reductions. 
The first three rules specify the behavior of the 
stack manipulation bytecodes: push  adds a value 
to  the stack, p o p  removes the top value, and pull 
copies a value from within the stack to the top of 
the stack. The next two rules govern the behavior 
of the control-flow primitive bez ("branch if equal to 
zero"), which, if the top stack value is zero, skips the 
next n instructions. The sixth rule encapsulates most 
of the rest of the SNAP bytecodes (like arithmetic, 
comparison, etc.), where  pi,^ [k ]  is the k-th primop 
with i stack value inputs and j stack value outputs. 
The most novel instruction, send,  creates a. new 
packet that is to  be sent elsewhere for execution. 
Concisely, send(n, s, r ' ,  d) sends a packet to destina- 
tion d that will begin execution a t  the nth instruc- 
tion and will take the top s stack values as its initial 
stack. Furthermore, the parent packet will donate T' 
of its resource bound to the new packet, with one re- 
source bound being consumed during transport. The 
grayed-out +local reduction (7) for send  is pro- 
vided only to  support proofs in the next section; the 
+,,t reduction (9) more accurately describes the 
full effect. 
Finally, rule (8) simply describes the normal ter- 
mination of a packet program; when there are no 
instructions left to  execute, the packet is discarded. 
Any transitions not covered in the above rules (e.g., 
running out of resource bound, type errors, stack un- 
derflow) are "stuck," and would result in some sort 
of error in an actual implementation. 
4 Safety 
4.1 Desired properties 
Safety is an important issue in a shared internetwork- 
ing infrastructurei t  should not be possible for mali- 
cious users to crash the network or otherwise make it 
unusable to others. Furthermore, the network must 
be robust to ill-formed packets (in the case of active 
packets, buggy packet programs). We follow the ap- 
proach of Wetherall [16] and guarantee safety similar 
to that provided by IPv4. 
There is an additional notion of safety that 
states that an active packet cannot crash or take 
over a node. This is typically implemented using 
techniques like software fault isolation [15], proof- 
carrying code [S], or dynamic interpretation checks. 
The SNAP semantics we presented earlier could be 
straightforwardly extended to include error transi- 
tions that encapsulate this kind of behavior, although 
we do not cover this extension here. Instead, we ad- 
dress some of the less well-understood aspects of node 
safety. 
Firstly, we want to limit the amount of denial-of- 
service damage that can be inflicted. In other words, 
we would like to have some guarantees about the 
amount of network resources that can be used by ac- 
tive packets. There are three main resources that 
concern us: CPU time, memory, and bandwidth. For 
processing an IPv4 packet, a node spends O(1ength) 
CPU time (header processing, including options, plus 
the time to forward the packet out the correct in- 
terface), and requires O(1ength) memory per packet 
(which can be reclaimed after the packet has been 
processed). Finally, the maximum bandwidth con- 
sumed by a unicast IPv4 packet is O(1ength x TTL) 
where TTL is the time-to-live field in the packet2. 
For an active packet scheme to have similar re- 
source consumption behavior to that of the Internet, 
then, we require the following properties: 
In this section, we define more precisely what we On One node, processing a packet P 
mean for an active packet scheme to be safe to run take O(Ip1) time, where Ipl is the length of p. 
in a network. These properties will be expressed in (2) On any one node, processing a packet p should terms of theorems we would like to prove about an ac- 
tive packet programming system. We will then prove require O(lp() memory. 
these theorems for SNAP, using the abstract machine 
"ate that this is not the case for multicast packets, which 
description we provided in the last section. have even worse global behavior. 
(3) The overall network bandwidth consumed by a each send  reduction, the total amount of resource 
packet p should be O(nlp1) where n is some re- bound in the network decreases by 1, therefore p (or 
source bound associated with p a t  its creation. p's descendents) can cause the creation of a t  most r 
new packets. 
Secondly, it should not be possible for an active 
packet to  directly affect the processing of other pack- T h e o r e m  4 (Isolation): If {p) -+iet Np and 
ets. Namely, we would like to ensure packet isolation: N +:a,t NN, then {p) U N -+Let N, U N N .  
Proof. Since the - i n e t  reduction affects one packet 
(4) The processing of a packet p should be indepen- at a time, 
dent of other packets in the network. 
{ p )  U N -i:,, Np U N +Eet NpU N N . ~  
4.2 Safety proofs 
We will now proceed to show that SNAP has the four 
safety properties we detailed above, namely, bounded 
resource usage and processing isolation. Due to space 
restrictions, we present here only the high-level de- 
tails; the full proofs are straightforward. 
T h e o r e m  1 (CPU safety): Let p = (r, Co, C, S) 
be a packet, and let ICI = k. Then for some n 5 k ,  
P ---+lbcal ( T I ,  CO, 0, St) .  
Proof. By induction on -+r,,,l: each local reduction 
removes a t  least one instruction from the sequence of 
commands left to  execute. 
T h e o r e m  2 (Memory  safety): Let 
p = ( r ,Co ,C ,S )  and p' = (r ' ,C;,Cf,S') be 
packets. If p p' then IS'( 5 (SJ + CI.  
Proof. This proof actually depends upon a prop- 
erty of the primitive operators opij[k]. Let 
g r o ~ t h ( o p ~ , ~ [ k ] )  = j - i. Then each local reduction 
adds a t  most 
Thus, the SNAP bytecodes adhere to  the four 
safety properties presented in the previous subsec- 
tion. 
5 Implementation 
We have written an implementation in C of a SNAP 
interpreter, snapd, that follows the semantics pre- 
sented in Section 3. Currently, snapd runs as a Linux 
user-space application, with packets transmitted via 
UDP [ll]. In this section, we describe how we have 
added detail to the general SNAP description to pro- 
vide a working active packet system. 
5.1 Representation 
First, we define the types of values supported by 
snap@: 32-bit integers, 32-bit IPv4 addresses, and 
variable-length byte arrays. In order to  support byte 
arrays (needed for payload delivery), we have added 
a "heap" to the packets. The actual byte arrays are 
stored in the heap, and their "stack val;esn are 32-bit 
values to the stack. Thus, we can limit the growth 
offsets into the heap. Thus all of our stack values are 
of the stack to a 'Onstant 
of the length the same size, permitting a and effi- 
of the packet' In the case of Our 
set of cient stack implementation. Currently, stack values bytecodes, m = 1. 
are 8 bytes (a 1 word type tag and a 1 word value); 
Theorem 3 (Bandwidth safety): Let we are exploring ways to reduce this space overhead. 
p = (r, Co, C, S) be a packet, and suppose The addition of a heap does not violate our mem- 
{p) -+Let N .  Then IN1 < r + 1. ory safety theorem from Section 4; when a byte 
proof. By induction on jnet: only the s end  array is copied via the pul l  instruction, only the 
instruction creates a new packet; the other two 3 ~ o t e  that SNAP does not specify the types of values, as 
+net reductions either decrease or maintain the +,he safety proofs rely only on the number of values in the stack, 
number of packets in the network. Furthermore, with not their type. 
-z 32 bits 
IPv4 destination address 
I IPv4 source address I 
I resource bound I flow identifier I 
I entry point (in # of instructions) I 
I code size (in octets) 1 
I heap size (in octets) I 
I stack size (in octets) I 
/C/ code /\C 
/iv "r' 
heap 
stack 
Figure 2: snmpd packet format 
stack-resident offset is copied. Further~nore, none of 
our primitive operators return or modify byte a.rray 
types, so a packet's heap cannot grow during execu- 
tion. 
We provide support for 53 bytecodes in snapd, in- 
cluding those for stack manipulation, control-flow, 
value operations, pacltct. header acccss, routing ta- 
ble access, packet creation, arid data tlelivery. All 
of these bytecodes can he modeled in the semantic 
framework of Section 3 either directly, as a. mernbrr. 
of the operators ~ p ~ , ~ [ k ] ,  or as an abbreviat,ion for 
sequence of other instructions. Currently, each byte- 
code instruction is 3 words (1 word opcodr, 2 wortls 
for an immediate stack value). Uniform-sizecl instruc- 
tions permit the straightforward implementation of 
branches and code entry points, as we are aholit t,o 
describe. 
tion, and flow identifier, as well as the resource bound 
field that is used for bandwidth safety as described 
earlier. Wc then have fields that delineate the three 
niain portions of the active packet: the code, heap, 
and stack. These three packet sections are laid out in 
t,his order to  permit minimal copying during execu- 
tion; the code and heap do not grow during execution, 
so its long as the containing buffer is big enough4, the 
initial stack may grow and shrink as needed. The last 
header field is the "entry point" field, which indicates 
at which instruction execution is to  begin; this per- 
mits the full generality of the s end  instruction with- 
out requiring that we retain t,wo copies of the packet 
code. 
The interpretation of most of the instructions is 
extremely straightforward, with the exception of the 
s end  bytecode. As the reader may recall from Sec- 
tion 3, s end  creates a new packet for execution that 
gets a subset of its parentj's full program, part of 
the parent's stack, and some of the parent's resource 
bound. The marshalling for the new packet is very 
straightforward; the parent's code is copied (and the 
entry point is set appropriately), the resource bound 
is deducted from the parent, and the top few stack 
values are copied, along with the portions of the heap 
(if any) to which they refer. These copies, however, 
arc expensive, as we will see in the next section; re- 
ducing or eliminating them is a topic for future re- 
search. 
6 Performance 
In this sect,ion, we present our experimental experi- 
ence with snapd. In particular, we investigate its la- 
tency and bandwidth characteristics to  support our 
clairii that SNAP can be efficiently implemented. All 
the experiments in this section were run on dual- 
CPU5 300-MHz Pentium I1 systems with 256 MB of 
RAM. These machines have 16 KB split first-level 
caches and unified 512 KB second level caches and 
rate 11.7 on SPECint95. The machines run Linux 
5.2 Packet Format 4 ~ e c a l l  that our memory safety theorem allows us to  put 
an uppcr bound on this size. 
Our packet format is shown in Figure 2. l i e  liavc 
.5snapd is single-threaded, so we do not take advantage of 
some standard header fields such as source, destina- this  parallelism. 
f  orw ; move on i f  not  a t  de s t  
bne 4 ; s k i p  4 i n s t r s  i f  nonzero on t op  
push 1 ; 1 means "on r e t u r n  t r i p "  
g e t s r c  ; g e t  source f i e l d  
forwto ; send r e t u r n  packet 
POP ; pop t h e  1 f o r  l o c a l  ping 
demux ; d e l i v e r  payload 
Figure 3: SNAP code for ping. 
kernel 2.0.30 and are connected by 100 Mb/s Ether- 
net links. 
Our latency results are based on 21 individual 
round-trip times; since the distribution of times is 
slightly skewed, we report medians as per Jain [ 5 ] .  
For our bandwidth results, we compute the average 
throughput based on the elapsed time required to 
send 100,000 packets. The times are measured on 
a clock with a 4 ps granularity. 
6.1 Latency 
First we measured snapd's latency, using round-trip 
times. The code for our ping packet is shown in 
Figure 3, and it is sent with the initial stack (0 :: 
portnum :: payload). We will now walk through the 
execution of this packet as an illustration of some of 
snapd's bytecode set. 
6.1.1 Ping benchmark 
Figure 3 shows the SNAP instructions used for our 
ping program. The first instruction executed is the 
forw bytecode. This compares the packet's destina- 
tion header field to  the current host's address. If they 
are different, then the packet is forwarded towards 
its destination. More specifically, a send is executed 
that donates all the remaining resource bound, takes 
the same code and entry point, and copies the whole 
stack and heap; the original packet then exits. 
When the packet reaches its destination, forw sim- 
ply drops through to the next instruction. The bne 
checks whether the top stack value is nonzero. In our 
example, since 0 is on top of the stack, the branch 
falls through and the 0 gets popped. Next, we push 
a 1 onto the stack-essentially replacing the earlier 
0, indicating we are now on the way back. The get- 
src instruction pushes a copy of the source header 
field onto the stack. The return packet is then gen- 
erated via the forwto instruction, which sets the 
source header field to the current host and the des- 
tination header field to the top stack value (in our 
case, now the original source), pops this latter argu- 
ment, keeps the same entry point, donates all remain- 
ing resource bound, and carries the whole stack (now 
1 :: portnum :: payload). 
On the return path, as before, most hops will just 
execute the forw instruction, although since the des- 
tination header field is now set back to the original 
source, the packet will progress in the correct di- 
rection. Upon reaching the source, the forw falls 
through, the bne skips 4 instructions6 (since the 1 
is on top of the stack), and the demux instruction 
delivers the payload to  the correct application port. 
6.1.2 Measurements 
We now present the results of executing the above 
ping program across several snapd nodes connected 
linearly. The size of the ping program is 148 bytes, 
so since we are encapsulated inside UDP and IP, the 
minimum Ethernet frame size is 176 bytes. We also 
measured the latencies for payloads resulting in 750 
byte (not shown) and 1500 byte frames. We con- 
trasted these results with those obtained by running 
the standard ICMP ECHO REPLY 1121 ping over 
the Linux kernel router. The payloads for the ICMP 
pings were set to  result in the same 176, 750, and 
1500 byte Ethernet frame sizes. 
The results are shown in Figure 4; the y-axis shows 
latency in microseconds, and the x-axis presents the 
number of hops, i.e., network links traversed (so 0 
hops is a machine pinging itself). Most strikingly, the 
snupd latencies are on the same order of magnitude 
as those for the Linux kernel version. 
Based on the slope of these lines for the two imple- 
mentations at multiple payload sizes, we can estimate 
G ~ h e  pop instruction is only used in the case where the 
destination and source are the same host; then when the packet 
is "at the destination," the forwto will fall through, so we have 
to pop the 1 we just pushed before demuxing. 
Hops 
80 - I I 
- snapd-blast 
snapd-1% 
l l l l ' l l l . - l  
Ethernet frame size (bytes) 
Figure 4: Ping latencies 
Linux 2.0.30 snapd 
Per-packet (ps) 
Per-byte (ps) 0.13 0.14 
Figure 6: Throughput measurements. 
livery. This permitted us a minimum Ethernet frame 
size of 108 bytes, and we take measurements for Eth- 
Figure 5: Cost breakdown ernet frame sizes in multiples of 100 bytes. We use 
t t c p  to measure the throughput of the Linux kernel 
router for comparison, setting the buffer sizes to re- 
per-hop and per-byte costs for both snapd and the 
Linux kernel as shown in Table 5. The higher per- 
byte cost for snapd can be attributed to the fact that 
forw requires the marshalling of a new copy of the 
packet. Most of the difference, though, comes from 
per-packet costs; since snapd is in user space, there 
are two kernel crossings per packet. We instrumented 
snapd with timers to verify these estimates-for max- 
imal packets, the main receive-interpret-send loop 
takes 129 ps, of which 98 ps is spent in the recvf rom 
and sendto system calls. This suggests that an in- 
kernel implementation of SNAP would have signifi- 
cantly lower latency. 
6.2 Bandwidth 
For the bandwidth measurements, we use three ma- 
chines connected linearly: a load generator, a for- 
warder, and a receiver. The load generator and re- 
ceiver do not run snapd, but rather send SNAP pack- 
ets directly to the forwarder so that we can directly 
measure routing throughput. We use a 2-instruction 
SNAP program (forw and demux) for payload de- 
sult in the same sized Ethernet frames as for snapd. 
The bandwidths presented are in terms of useful pay- 
load delivered, i.e., not including header or program 
size, so snapd is penalized for tunneling inside UDP. 
We took four sets of measurements: t t c p  sending 
UDP (which often had high packet loss), t t c p  us- 
ing TCP with the NODELAY option set, our SNAP 
sender running full blast, and our SNAP sender send- 
ing just slowly enough to ensure at most a 1% packet 
loss. The results are shown in Figure 6. The y-axis 
plots throughput in Mb/s, while the x-axis plots the 
resulting Ethernet frame size. 
Notice that the t t c p  curves have knees in them 
where the payload sizes become large enough that 
the bottleneck switches from CPU to 110. There is no 
such obvious knee in the snapd curves, however. Since 
snapd must interpret its packets, the higher compu- 
tation overhead results in a lower-sloped "ramping 
up" section. Unfortunately, this slope is low enough 
that we reach the maximal Ethernet frame size before 
levelling off; high payload sizes would result in frag- 
mentation that would cloud the issues. Nonetheless, 
at the higher payloads, snapd with a loss rate under 
1% sustains a bandwidth higher than that of TCP 
(though not yet quite as high as UDP). By reducing 
our kernel crossing overheads as mentioned in the 
latency subsection, we could hope to  see a reduced 
CPU overhead, perhaps seeing a more pronounced 
knee similar to  that of the Linux kernel router. 
7 Conclusions 
We have designed a new active packet language, 
SNAP (Safe Networking with Active Packets), and 
presented a formal semantics for it. We have used 
this semantic framework to prove that SNAP pro- 
grams are safe in terms of resource usage and isola- 
tion. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof 
of safety for an active packet scheme. 
Furthermore, we have implemented a SNAP in- 
terpreter, snapd, that  achieves high performance for 
standard networking tasks, despite running in user 
space over UDP. In fact, these results challenge the 
commonly-held belief that active packet processing 
must be relegaked to the control plane. Indeed, the 
current implementation is already fast enough for all 
but the fastest backbone routers in the Internet. A 
future, in-kernel implementation promises to  reduce 
our overhead, improving snapd's performance even 
further. 
To be usable in a shared network infrastructure, 
an active packet system must be both safe and ef- 
ficient. Previous active packet schemes have either 
not adequately addressed safety and security, or they 
have done so a t  the cost of performance. SNAP and 
snapd provide the first active packet system that is 
demonstrably both safe and efficient. 
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